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INTRODUCTION
Tax is a compulsory payment, in exchange for which the
taxpayer does not receive immediate direct benefits (i.e. it is
unrequited). Taxes cover the costs of allocation of public
goods. Their other function is to provide for income
redistribution together with transfers. There are various social
preferences regarding redistribution, which are basically
related to the issue as to what extent the groups with different
levels of income should be beneficiaries or bearers of burdens.
On the basis of fairness, usually a deviation from vertical
equity (i.e. contribution in equal proportion to income,
independent of income level) is preferred, in other words
lower incomes should be taxed at a lower rate, while higher
incomes should be taxed at a higher rate.
This article deals with two other dimensions of taxation:
horizontal equity and efficiency, as well as the relationship
between these dimensions and tax evasion. Conditions for
horizontal equity hold true if taxpayers with the same income
bear the same tax burden. A tax system is efficient if it ensures a
given tax revenue at a minimum social cost. Social cost has three
elements: the cost of tax administration, the cost of compliance
and the excess burden caused by the distorting effects of taxes on
economic behaviour. Excess burden is the welfare loss caused by
taxation over and above the revenue it raises. The excess burden
increases with the square of the tax rate. On the other hand, the
higher is the tax elasticity of the commodity or income, the
higher the loss. Therefore, in order to minimise the loss, tax rates
should be inversely proportional to their elasticities. In this case,
for example, there would be a lower-than-average tax burden on
capital incomes and higher incomes and a higher-than-average
burden on basic consumer goods.
Efficiency considerations, namely tax rates inversely
proportional to elasticities, may conflict with the social
preferences regarding vertical equity. While efficiency would
require preferential rate for higher incomes, fairness would
justify just the opposite. One possible solution is when
taxation addresses efficiency considerations, while social
transfers ensure fairness. The underlying reason is that
fairness can be assured not only by progressive taxation, but
also through social transfers. However, one must not forget
that, depending on the specific design, a reduced tax burden
and a transfer may have different effects.
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From the perspective of our analysis, it is a more interesting
issue that tax burdens inversely proportional to elasticities
may also violate the principle of horizontal equity. The
underlying reason is that the tax burden on the income of
corporations, entrepreneurs and employees of small
companies is lower than that of other employees who earn
the same income. On the one hand, the higher elasticity of
the former incomes stems from the fact that the first group of
taxpayers can respond to an increase in tax burdens with a
real change of its activity (for example, by restraining its
labour supply or relocating its activity in another country).
On the other hand, they may also react with tax evasion, i.e.
with an apparent change of activity, for example by
underreporting the registered activity, hiding the profit and
transferring it abroad.
The remaining part of the article first examines the issue of
tax evasion and its magnitude in Hungary, followed by a
review of how, on the basis of international experience, it
would be possible to reduce the elasticity of tax bases allowed
by tax evasion.
Tax evasion reduces the efficiency of the economy as unequal opportunities of tax evasion leads to an inefficient distribution
of resources. In Hungary, based on data for 2005–2006, tax evasion resulted in a transfer of 7.9 per cent of GDP from taxpayers
to tax evaders. Following measures aimed to reduce tax evasion, this transfer was estimated to be 6.7 per cent of GDP in 2006
and 2007. Underlying reasons for tax evasion are the different burdens on labour and capital incomes. According to
international experience, either the control of splitting labour and capital incomes or bringing their contribution burdens closer
to one another can help in this situation. The effect of administrative measures is often temporary, because they do not improve
tax-compliance attitude. A positive change in taxpayers’ attitude is an especially difficult task; one of its possible means can be
a shift in the tax burden in favour of local taxes.
Judit Krekó–Gábor P. Kiss: Tax evasion and tax
changes in Hungary
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The concept of tax evasion is used below in a broader sense,
including both tax avoidance, which exploits the loopholes in
the tax system, and the clearly illegal tax evasion. However,
it may be justified to distinguish them because they require
different solutions. As tax avoidance is attributable to
loopholes in taxation, the solution can be to change the tax
system in such a way as to make it more difficult to
circumvent the rules. In the case of the loopholes granted by
a compromise between the authority and the taxpayer (e.g. in
the case of the acceptance of a minimum payment), the
question is to what extent the compromise can be considered
as reasonable. Besides administrative efforts (controls,
penalty) and improving the tax-compliance attitude, illegal
tax evasion can also be reduced by adequately changing the
tax system. International experience regarding the impact of
tax changes on tax evasion are discussed in more detail in the
next part.
As mentioned in the Introduction, taxes, on the one hand,
cover the costs of allocation of public goods, and, on the
other hand, ensure income redistribution together with
transfers. Consequently, the tax-compliance attitude is partly
determined by how – for services of what quality, at what
rate of corruption – the paid taxes are spent according to the
perception of taxpayers. The other determining factor is the
perceived fairness of the tax system, i.e. to what extent it
meets the distribution preferences regarding horizontal and
vertical equity.
Tax evasion is a serious problem because it may result in a
significant welfare loss by allowing transfers from taxpayers
to tax evaders. This loss is due to an efficiency loss on the one
hand and horizontal inequity on the other hand. Efficiency is
reduced because the unequal opportunity of tax evasion leads
to an inefficient distribution of resources. Enterprises
exploiting the various opportunities of tax evasion gain
unjustified advantage over their competitors, as they are able
to pay wages which are consistent with the labour market
equilibrium even if the labour is used at a much lower
efficiency. Meanwhile, due to the loss of tax revenue, the tax
burden on those who cannot avoid paying their taxes has to
be increased, and thus the companies that are more efficient
(i.e. by using one unit of labour, they produce higher added
value and income which can be redistributed), but comply
with the rules, may be not competitive in the labour market.
Horizontal equity is violated by the fact that a group of
taxpayers is able to hide their income; therefore, the other
group of taxpayers pays instead of them as well, which results
in a further deterioration of the tax-compliance attitude. It is
hard to estimate these welfare losses, but it is certain that the
loss is smaller than the size of the ‘transfer’ allowed by tax
evasion. Since the costs of the fight against tax evasion (the
costs of tax administration and compliance) may be very high
beyond a certain point, an optimal level of tax evasion exists,
where the total cost including welfare loss is minimal.
Not only the optimal level of tax evasion, but even its current
magnitude is hard to estimate because in the case of a part of
economic agents the actual sales and income remain hidden.
In a statistical sense those activities belong to the hidden
economy which, according to international methodology,
constitute a part of production, but are missing from the
statistical surveys and administrative data. In Hungary, the
estimate of the Central Statistical Office (CSO) for the hidden
economy reached 16 per cent and 12 per cent of GDP in
1997 and 2000, respectively.
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At the same time, there are several methods to estimate the
size of the hidden economy: comparison with pieces of
information independent of the tax returns, food
consumption, representative survey of earnings, electricity
consumption. In the case of Hungary, the estimates based on
various methods determine the ratio of the hidden economy
as 20-30 per cent of the official GDP. This estimated ratio in
the 1990s and early 2000s can be classified as extraordinary
high even when compared with the developed countries
(Schneider, 2005, Lackó, 2000, Renooy et al., 2005).
However, some estimates found an improving trend as well
compared to the early 1990s. In the group of companies
examined by Semjén and Tóth (2004) (which account for 70
per cent of GDP) the weight of the hidden economy declined
between 1996 and 2001, but, according to their conclusion,
this took place partly as a result of ‘contracting out’ the tax
evasion. They found that its main form is employment at an
extremely low level of wages, as a means of reducing taxes.
According to the EU’s comparative analysis, in 1998 the ratio
of underreported work (black and grey labour) was 18 per
cent, which is similarly high to the levels of Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia
3 (European Commission,
2004). According to more recent estimates regarding
underreported work (Juhász et al., 2006) this ratio is higher
again, between 20-30 per cent.
According to Szabó’s estimate (2007) based on a comparison
of expenditures and incomes from a household panel survey,
6 per cent of households may belong to the hidden economy.
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2This is below the 15 per cent estimated for Poland and Slovakia, but exceeds the 7 per cent for the Czech Republic. At the two dates the Eurostat methodologies
applied by the CSO were different; the differences may explain half of the decline. In the figure for 1997 even those were included who would otherwise not be subject
of taxation under the relevant provisions of law; therefore, the figure for 2000 is more appropriate for estimating the degree of tax evasion.
3 However, in Slovakia, Poland and especially in the Czech Republic and Estonia the estimated situation was more favourable.In the author’s opinion this ratio may be higher because
participants of the hidden economy may have refused to
answer, and even if they did answer, they may have shown
their grey income as legal. A significant part of the hidden
economy is concentrated in the group of small enterprises;
the average hidden income of the self-employed exceeds that
of employees by at least 24 percentage points. (Benedek and
Lelkes, 2007) In the case of certain professions, 80 per cent
of their total transactions may be related to the hidden
economy, the weight of which is 52 per cent within their
total expenditure (Semjén et al., 2001).
According to the findings of our earlier study (Krekó and P.
Kiss, 2007), the total effect of the various channels of tax
evasion may be around 21 per cent of revenues. This
estimate, augmented with a review of developments in 2006
and 2007, is presented below. The starting point of the
estimate was that the various channels of tax evasion are
connected. An obvious solution is failing to issue an invoice;
this way not only the tax on the income from the invoice
value, but also the VAT can be saved. Based on this, we
started from the assumption that at the level of the economy,
the magnitude of the hidden domestic sales is equal to the
magnitude of hidden income. We also assumed that all
hidden income is missing from labour incomes, as taxes and
contributions on the latter are much higher than the tax on
income withdrawn as corporate profit. Moreover, the profit
can further be reduced by inflated costs; therefore, its actual
burden is minimal. The form of hiding labour income is that
employees are paid (partly) ‘under the table’, while the self-
employed report only a minimum income in the form of
wages.
VAT EVASION
The efficiency of VAT and the magnitude of VAT evasion can
be measured by a comparison of the actual and potential VAT
revenues. Potential VAT revenues are calculated by
multiplying the weighted average of nominal VAT rates with
the potential VAT basis (purchased consumption in national
accounts minus VAT revenues). The ratio between actual and
potential revenues is called the VAT efficiency indicator. As
the potential VAT basis is determined by the estimate of the
CSO for the hidden economy, the ratio between the actual
and potential revenues could reflect this estimate.
We carried out a comparison where we tried to determine the
actual tax base on the basis of tax returns and the potential
tax base on the basis of CSO statistics. Due to methodological
differences, the contents of the VAT return – as they follow
the regulations of the given year – change every year.
Moreover, the tax bases in the VAT return are so different
from the CSO data that we could only find a quite aggregated
breakdown (See Krekó and P. Kiss, 2007 for details). Our
findings are presented in Chart 1, but we do emphasise that
they should be interpreted with caution.
Another possibility for estimation stems from the fact that
monthly VAT revenues on a cash basis are available starting
from 1995, and their change can be divided into a part that
can be explained with various factors and to a part that
cannot be explained. This latter residual part can be
considered as the effect of the change in tax evasion. We
prepared our calculation for the change in the gross VAT
revenue, as it is difficult to exclude the effect of the
government discretionary timing of refunds (bringing them
forward or delaying them) from the net revenue. Therefore,
only a partial estimate can be prepared for the tax evasion
carried out in the form of refund, as the gross VAT payment
reflects only the effect of VAT deduction, but not its amount
requested to be refunded in money.
In addition to the dynamics of household consumption,
several factors explain the trends in gross VAT payments. The
most important one of these factors is the estimated effect of
changes in taxes; thus, for example, we deducted the total
amount of the simplified entrepreneurial tax (SET) revenue
from the VAT, assuming that the former completely replaced
the latter. Second, the same net cash-flow revenue may evolve
with different combinations of cumulated gross payments and
refunds; therefore, it is also worth eliminating the effect of
changes in their accumulation from the gross VAT payment.
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4 We made a correction for the fact that after 2004 the dynamics of gross VAT revenues was restrained by the termination of the collection at the border which reduced
accumulation (and thus the refund as well).
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VAT-loss based on cash-flow data
VAT-loss based on CSO data for consumption
Source: own calculations.Third, the comparison would be distorted by the fact that the
weights of other smaller tax bases (housing construction,
government purchase) also changed, and thus we also made
corrections for the effect of this. There is only one
explanatory factor the effect of which we did not estimate.
This is the changes in the composition of household
consumption, but we assumed that different VAT rates were
not a considerable effect on the changes of revenue.
Chart 1 presents a comparison of tax returns and CSO figures
on the one hand, as well as the estimate of the change in tax
evasion from the revenues on a cash basis, on the other hand.
As for the level of the cash-flow estimation, we assumed that
the comparison between tax returns and the CSO figures
provides a good estimate for the magnitude of tax evasion as
an average of the period. This is an acceptable assumption, as
thus the result for the level of the cash-flow estimation is that
evasion did not decline below 5 per cent even in the most
favourable year. 
The chart shows that according to the cash-flow estimation
VAT evasion declined significantly between 1995 and 1999,
and then increased steadily between 2000 and 2004 before
starting to decline again in 2005. Our earlier study followed
the developments only until 2006. We have now prepared an
estimate for 2007 as well, indicating a more than 3
percentage point decline in VAT evasion. The following is a
review of the possible explanations of this strong fluctuation,
first examining the domestic VAT, then the import VAT.
On the one hand, one of the ways of avoiding the domestic
VAT is that reporting lower sales than the sale value
threshold makes exemption from taxes possible. At times of
sudden valorisations of this threshold (doubled in 1995,
1997 and 2003) it was more difficult to leave the group of
taxpayers, while in the interim periods it became increasingly
easier because of the lack of valorisation. On the other hand,
those who became subject of VAT above this threshold could
continue the evasion of VAT by underreporting their sales,
while they could deduct the VAT of their purchases from this
reported obligation. In 2003 and 2004, the increase in
evasion may have been related to the introduction and
expansion of the SET, which may have resulted in a bigger
loss of VAT than the revenues from the SET were. Although
the obligation to pay SET on the sales revenue replaces the
VAT obligation, the possibility of VAT deduction ceased to
exist only in principle. The underlying explanation is that by
establishing affiliated companies, taxpayers requested the
refunding of the VAT content of received invoices in another
company belonging to them. This possibility ceased to exist
as of 2006, when the reduced standard VAT rate (20%)
became lower than the raised SET rate (25%).
The evasion of import VAT, which caused serious problems
in the early 1990s, declined steadily from 1995. New
companies did not have a chance to avoid paying the import
VAT, because when they imported, they immediately had to
pay a deposit. Later they could be exempted from this
requirement, if they qualified as reliable taxpayers. After
joining the EU, evasion increased again, as with the
termination of the customs borders between Member States
the imposition of taxes was replaced by self-assessment for
those subject to VAT. Following our EU accession, cross-
border transactions with chains of traders exploiting the rules
of Community sales were identified in exports as well, where
the trader can sell at favourable prices by the insertion of a
fictitious ‘missing trader’, avoiding the payment of VAT on
sales. The revealed amount equals 0.1 per cent of GDP,
which, depending on the efficiency of the investigations,
suggests that 1 to 2 per cent of GDP may be lost at the level
of tax bases due to these types of VAT frauds. This size of this
difference matches the statistical gap which evolved between
the import-export balance on an accrual basis and the
relevant financial statistics on a cash basis. There is usually a
difference between the two statistics because of natural
reasons as well, but due to the different data sources we may
also assume that financial statistics on a cash basis that are
built on data collection through questionnaires and data
reporting by banks are less sensitive to these forms of VAT
fraud. Based on the statistical deviation, between 2004 and
2006 evasion could be higher, then from 2007 the lost tax
base may have declined by as much as half per cent of GDP.
In the case of excise goods, illegal imports were motivated by
the fact that the excise tax burden, further increased by VAT
payable on this burden, was very high compared to that in
some of the neighbouring countries. The resulting loss in
VAT was reduced by the increased control of excise goods
from 2006. According to various estimations, the controls
added 0.1 per cent of GDP to the excise tax in 2007,
simultaneously increasing VAT revenues as well.
EVASION OF INCOME TAXES AND
CONTRIBUTIONS
We do not deal with the group of companies excluding small
enterprises because, according to earlier analyses (Semjén and
Tóth, 2004), tax evasion has declined among them, and was
partly ‘contracted out’ in the form of employment at a low
wage level. This group of employees turned into
economically dependent workers (outsourcing, contracting
out). This group is formally self-employed, but essentially
they can be considered as forced or involuntary
entrepreneurs. In the following, we examine the self-
employed (private entrepreneurs, partners of companies)
first, then employees.
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employed, these people contribute to the taxation only by 0.8
per cent of GDP, which is a disproportionately low figure
compared to employees. However, the group of the self-
employed is not homogeneous; it ranges from dependent
workers to high-income entrepreneurs. If the share of low-
income entrepreneurs is higher, it is also possible, in
principle, that the contribution to GDP and average income
of the self-employed is actually lower than those of the
employees. By contrast, the comparison of the sectoral
distribution of private entrepreneurs and employees justifies
only a minor difference; in 2005, calculating whole-economy
earnings with the weights of private entrepreneurs’ sectoral
distribution, the resulting earnings would be only 4 per cent
lower than the average earnings. (Obviously, the group of
employees does not provide an adequate basis for
comparison either, as tax evasion is significant here as well.)
Based on the Hungarian personal income tax returns, private
entrepreneurs’ tax basis is below that of employees; in 2001
employees’ total income was only 8 per cent higher than that
of private entrepreneurs, while in 2005 it was already 85 per
cent higher. Based on the returns, entrepreneurs’ tax basis
were calculated as 2 per cent of their total reported revenues,
i.e. private entrepreneurs calculated a 98 per cent cost ratio
on average in 2005, and 61 per cent of private enterprises
were loss-makers or operated at break-even. Half of this
group reported losses in 2007 as well, although almost
without exception they also complied with the minimum tax
requirement introduced from the second half of 2007, which
is 2 per cent of the sales revenue which can be corrected with
limited items. This measure will have a full-year effect on
2008.
Tax evasion is further increased by stating labour incomes as
capital incomes, which is profitable because there is a
substantial difference between the effective tax and
contribution burdens on the two types of income. No data
are available for us regarding the illegal forms of declaring
labour incomes as entrepreneurial income (simulated
contracts). For private entrepreneurs and small companies
another form of rechannelling labour incomes is splitting the
entrepreneur’s income into labour and capital incomes. For
example, private entrepreneurs determine their own labour
income (entrepreneur’s withdrawal), which is the basis for
the social security contribution, by self-assessment, which
practically allows for the legal avoidance of contribution
payment. Based on the personal income tax returns, in the
case of the private entrepreneurs that declare labour income
(180,000 people in 2005), for 77 per cent of them this
income (which is the basis for the social security
contribution) was below the minimum wage, and for 92 per
cent of them below twice the minimum wage (75 per cent of
the average wage). The amount of average labour income did
not reach the amount of the minimum wage, which was only
36 per cent of employees’ average salary. Therefore, from
September 2006, a required minimum basis for contribution
was introduced for entrepreneurs as well, amounting to the
double of the minimum wage. (In 2007 the total additional
revenue may have amounted to 0.2 per cent of GDP, but only
a part of it was paid by the self-employed.)
Another possibility is comparison with the average of the EU,
where the share of the self-employed within the employed
exceeds that of Hungary only by a small extent. Assuming
that not only the ratio of the number of Hungarian self-
employed persons but also their actual contribution to GDP
is close to that of the EU, the difference between their
reported income in Hungary and in the EU (2.2 per cent of
GDP in 2005) can be seen as a result of a higher Hungarian
tax evasion.
5 As an EU average, we assumed a 30 per cent
magnitude of tax evasion. Adding this revenue loss of 1.5 per
cent of GDP to the Hungarian loss which exceeds the average
by 2.2 percentage points, we estimated the lost revenue from
self-employed as 3.7 per cent of GDP for 2005. As in the case
of the major part of the tax base the total burden (tax and
contributions on labour incomes) exceed 50 per cent, this
loss may result from a 7.5 per cent evasion of the tax base. As
a result of the measures taken in 2006 and 2007 (minimum
tax and minimum base of contributions), this magnitude may
gradually decline by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage point. Another
reducing factor is the decline in the ratio of the self-
employed, which may reduce their total income by a further
0.6 percentage point. Accordingly, tax evasion may decrease
to 6.7 per cent of GDP.
These measures which affect all self-employed reflect new
approach of the authorities abandoning the earlier approach
of differentiation by professions or sectors. As we mentioned
above, the group of the self-employed is not homogeneous at
all. In the case of some professions income underreporting
may even reach 80 per cent of total transactions; this is why
individual professions used to be treated separately (for
example, in the case of certain professions the option of
simple flat-rate taxation was introduced replacing all normal
taxes (including VAT), whereas in the case of other
professions average figures regarding the presumed income
were published by the tax authority).
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5 According to Eurostat, as an EU average the implicit tax rate of the self-employed is only two thirds of the implicit tax rate of companies, which is partly attributable
to the lower tax burdens and partly to underreporting incomes and inflated costs. Estimates for income underreporting of the self-employed are available only for a
few countries, e.g. England (35%, Pissarides and Weber, 1989), Finland (16-40%, Johansson, 2000) and Sweden (30%, Engström and Holmlund, 2006).The best example of the new approach of the authorities is
the introduction of the SET in 2003, which became an option
for a wide range of entrepreneurs and companies, as it could
be simply chosen on the basis of the amount of the sales
revenue, without any restrictions for given professions or
sectors. First, companies and private entrepreneurs with sales
revenues below HUF 15 million were allowed to opt for the
SET, then, from 2005, this limit was raised to HUF 25
million. Within the framework of the SET, enterprises used
to pay 15 per cent of their sales revenues, which was
increased to 25 per cent as of September 2006. This replaced
entrepreneurs’ personal income tax, the dividend tax and the
VAT of entrepreneurs and the corporate profit tax in the case
of companies. The basis of the social security contribution is
the minimum wage.
The compromise (lower tax and contribution) made with the
taxpayers who chose the SET is reasonable in a sense that the
SET reduces the costs of tax administration and compliance,
and may increase the willingness to pay tax. It is especially
favourable for those taxpayers who reported inflated costs
earlier.
However, due to the lack of restrictions in terms of
professions or sectors, the SET means an actual saving of
taxes for those taxpayers who have a low cost ratio in reality.
Consequently, nearly 60 per cent of those who opted for the
SET operated in the sectors of real estate activities and
economic services, where the cost ratio is in fact lower. This
tax saving is indicated by the fact that very few enterprises
chose to leave the SET following the 10 percentage point
increase in the SET rate in 2006. Another incentive is that the
double basis of contributions introduced later has not become
applicable to the SET, as due to the simplified accounting
requirement there is no means of control. By virtue of its low
tax and contribution burden and its simplicity the SET is
especially advantageous for employees, although they can
choose the SET only after a transitional period (first they
have to become entrepreneurs).
6 It is a strong incentive for
simulated contracts changing the employee status to a SET-
paying entrepreneur’s contract that the higher the total
labour costs, the more advantageous the SET, partly due to
the flat-rate replacing progressive taxation and partly due to
the required ‘fixed’ minimum contribution replacing the
social security contribution payable in proportion of labour
income.
Overall, as a result of a compromise, the SET was able to
attract some tax evaders to the legal economy, although it
ensured unjustifiably low taxes for others, as there was no
adequate control of entry. In other words, the price of
simplicity was that in the case of some professions the
elasticity of tax bases reflected in tax evasion increased.
An internationally widespread form of income
underreporting is when companies report their employees
with lower wages than their actual wages, for example as
part-time employees or employees with minimum wage, and
pay the difference – free of taxes and contributions – ‘under
the table’. Analysing 17 countries, Tonin (2006) came to the
conclusion that there is a positive correlation between the
ratio of minimum wage earners and the size of the hidden
economy. According to foreign experience, companies
respond to increases in the minimum wage by changing part-
time employment (Ressler et al., 1996); one of the ways is to
declare a shorter working time than the actual working
hours. The role of part-time employment in tax evasion in
Hungary can be illustrated by the fact that when the
minimum wage was doubled in 2001–2002, the ratio of
employees declaring less than the minimum wage increased
from 16 per cent in 2000 to 26 per cent in 2002, while the
working time survey did not show any rise in the number of
people employed in part-time jobs. In 2000, 572,000 people
declared an income in a range between the old and the new
minimum wages, but 354,000 of them remained in the same
range in spite of the increase in minimum wages, while the
number of employees declaring minimum wages increased
from 177,000 only to 225,000 despite the doubling of the
minimum wage.
According to the personal income tax returns, 30 per cent
and 25 per cent of taxpayers earned minimum wages or less
in 2005 and 2006, respectively. However, these income
distribution figures for the whole year cannot be compared
with the earning statistics of the EU, based on which, in turn,
it can be established that in 2005 8 per cent of full-time
employees received wages proportional to the minimum
wage in terms of working time. The question is whether the
different hours of work indicated by the various data can
cause a difference of this degree. Using the wage distribution
of full-time workers of companies with more than 4
employees for 2005 and the labour survey data regarding
part-time employment and the number of those who work
only during a part of the year, we estimated a hypothetical
annual wage distribution. This shows what the distribution of
all employed taxpayers’ annual labour income would look
like, assuming that the monthly wage distribution of the
employees of companies with more than 4 persons is not far
from the monthly wage distribution of all employees. This
assumption by itself would be distorting, because the actual
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6 For example, in the case of an annual net labour cost of HUF 4.8 million – i.e. a gross HUF 6 million income similar to the average income of those who pay SET – the
SET results in a nearly 75% higher net income than employee status does.income of enterprises employing less than 5 people may be
lower than that of companies with more than 4 workers, on
the other hand the phenomenon of underreported wage also
exists among companies with more than 4 persons, and this
alters the result in exactly the opposite direction (Krekó and
P. Kiss, 2007).
According to our findings, in 2005 the number of employees
whose wage really did not exceed the minimum wage could
be 700,000-750,000. Consequently, it can be calculated that
approximately 460,000 employees reported a lower than
actual wage. As a result, in this group more than 2 per cent
of GDP may have been lost from the total labour income.
Assuming that our estimate is an adequate basis for
comparison in 2006 as well, based on the personal income
tax returns only 1.4 per cent of GDP may be underreported.
However, for 2006 it can be seen that the minimum wage
peak became somewhat flatter, tax evasion may have partly
declined and reported income partly passed through from the
range below the minimum wage to the range above the
minimum wage.
We have not prepared an estimate for the wage
underreporting of employees above the minimum wage, but
used the correlation according to which it is the
underreporting of domestic sales that allows for hiding
income as well. Accordingly, deducting the hidden income of
the self-employed from the hidden sales, we receive the
hidden wage of employees. However, the categories of the
self-employed and of the employees partially overlap, as
those self-employed who, as members of companies are
registered with their own firms also appear as employees.
Table 1 is a summary of our findings based on the personal
income tax returns of 2005 and the estimated VAT lost up to
2006 (the 2005–2006 column) and the updates based on the
personal income tax returns of 2006 and the estimated VAT
lost up to 2007 (the 2006–2007 column). Here, it is the
combined effect of the various forms of tax evasion that is
presented; its further breakdown would only be illustrative
(Krekó and P. Kiss, 2007).
Estimated on the basis of 1995–2006, VAT evasion could
amount to 14 per cent. Considering its factors, we know that
the statistical estimate for the underreported domestic sales is
12 per cent, thus 2 per cent remains for underreported
import and inflated VAT refund. Excluding the VAT content
of the 12 per cent, 10 per cent income underreporting is
estimated. Total hidden income may be 11 per cent, because
taxable income may be reduced by around 1 per cent by
inflated costs which would actually constitute private
(household) consumption. The self-employed and those
employees who are registered at and below the minimum
wage may hide an income of 9.2 per cent of GDP together,
provided that the magnitude of the assumed overlap between
them reaches 0.3 per cent of GDP. This means that 1.8 per
cent of GDP remains for wage underreporting by other
employees. This may partly be the result of hidden wages
above the minimum wage, and partly may include undeclared
(black) labour as well.
As an average of 2006–2007, the lost tax base of VAT may
amount to 12 per cent, of which domestic sales may amount
to 10.2 percentage points. Accordingly, after the deduction
of VAT, the result is an underreported income of 8.5 per cent
of GDP, and assuming a 1 per cent for inflated cost it allows
for a 9.5 per cent hidden income. Of this, the tax evasion of
employees registered at or below the minimum wage is
supposed to have dropped to 1.4 per cent based on the
personal income tax returns. Presuming a 6.7 per cent tax
base avoidance of the self-employed and a 0.2 per cent
overlap, the hidden income of these two groups may reach
7.9 per cent of GDP. Consequently, the remaining 1.6 per
cent may be the result of hidden wage of other employees.
In 2005, wage underreporting may have affected
approximately 12.5 per cent of employees’ total wage
income, followed by an estimated decline to 10 per cent in
2006. This is in line with the fact that in 2006 the number of
those who submitted personal income tax returns increased
by 2.4 per cent, which may partly be related to a decline in
black labour. In addition to that, there was also a change in
the composition of those who filed tax returns; the ratio of
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2005–2006 2006–2007
Lost VAT base 14.0 12.0
Underreported (grey) wages of those reporting minimum wage or less 2.0 1.4
Underreported (grey) wages of those reporting more than the minimum 
wage + undeclared (black) labour n. a. n. a.
Tax evasion of the self-employed 7.5 6.7
Table 1
Estimated loss of tax base
(as a percentage of GDP)
Source: own calculations.those above the minimum wage rose noticeably, i.e. there
may have been some whitening taking place in terms of wage
level too. Estimates suggest that it occurred gradually during
the year, reaching 2.5 per cent by the last quarter
7 (Eppich
and Lõrincz, 2007).
Table 2 presents the lost revenue which can be estimated on
the basis of the tax base evaded. While based on 2005–2006
the estimated lost revenue reached 7.9 per cent of GDP,
based on 2006–2007 the loss may have declined to 6.7 per
cent. Two thirds of the tax evasion (income taxes and
contributions) is concentrated among the self-employed and
a part of employees, while one third (VAT and excise tax) is
shared between a more stable group of sellers and a variable
one of buyers. With the exception of buyers, the groups of
tax avoiders and taxpayers can be separated, i.e. a dual
system can be outlined, where 90 per cent of the estimated
tax evasion can be considered as transfers between these two
groups.
TAX CHANGES – INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE 
The theory of optimal taxation is based on the assumption
that the various tax systems can be compared depending on
the objective of the government, i.e. it can be examined as to
which tax structure is the most favourable in terms of social
welfare. This requires the estimation of how economic agents
react to a given structure of taxes in the current equilibrium
and in all other possible equilibria. Due to the lack of
complete information, this complex response cannot be
examined in practice; instead, using a solution which requires
much less information, the analysis of the so-called marginal
tax reform can be performed. This analysis may provide an
answer as to the direction of changes in individual taxes in
order to increase social welfare, but cannot provide any
information on the extent and ranking of the measures. In
addition to the analysis of taxes, transfers also need to be
analysed, since it is not worth separating the distribution and
incentive effects of taxes and transfers.
It is an additional problem that the starting point of the
analysis of the marginal tax reform would exactly be the
current tax evasion behaviour, and the analysis would not be
able to take into account the complex effect of the proposed
changes on behaviour. If, let’s say, the elasticity of individual
tax bases related to tax evasion could be reduced, the
question is how it would affect real elasticity. For example,
by terminating simulated contracts, a part of the dependent
staff could be driven back to employee status (their tax
evasion elasticity would decline), although another part of
them would not be able to enter the labour market (their real
elasticity would increase) because of higher taxes.
The question is whether reducing high tax rates can be a
solution. Neither theoretically, nor on the basis of empirical
experience can it be stated that reducing the rates would in
itself increase tax compliance, thus increasing the tax bases
over the short run. Although numerous empirical analyses
found a positive correlation between the tax burden and the
grey economy (e.g. Schneider, 2005), experience suggests
that the reduction of the tax burden itself does not reduce the
size of the hidden economy, and only because of declining
tax rates the attitude of tax payers does not change.
Accordingly, if tax evasion has become a widespread practice,
tax cuts do not provide sufficient incentives, not even if it was
partly the high taxes that constituted the underlying reason
for the evolution of tax evasion. In addition, the relationship
between high taxes and tax evasion is endogenous, i.e. tax
rates are high as a consequence of the widespread informal
economy. Increase in the tax base and improvement in the
tax compliance were experienced only in the case of such
comprehensive reforms which, in addition to reducing the
tax rates, also aimed at the reduction of the elasticity of the
‘grey’ tax bases, including, for example, the simplification of
the tax system, eliminating elements that encourage and
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2005–2006 2006–2007
VAT 2.3 2.0
Excise tax 0.4 0.3
Tax and contribution on labour incomes 5.0 4.2




(as a percentage of GDP)
Source: own calculations.
7 However, based on these estimates, the gradual process of whitening is discontinued in early 2007.allow for tax evasion, enhancing tax audits and a significant
improvement of administration (e.g. Russia 2001, Sweden
1991). Analysing Austria’s tax reform in 1988, Schneider
(1994) found that a tax cut did not result in a significant
reduction of the grey economy, because the regulation did
not change. In their New Zealand analysis, Giles et al. (1999)
found some evidence that the grey economy responds to tax
cuts to a lesser extent than to tax increases. All this calls the
attention to the fact that it is better to carry out a
comprehensive tax reform when the favourable budget
balance and a cut of expenditure allow for a loss of tax
revenues and a gradual improvement in tax compliance.
The question is whether it is possible to restructure the tax
burden between the tax evaders and the taxpayers. The
problem is that a taxpayer’s reaction to a tax cut is less elastic
than a tax evader’s reaction to a tax increase. In other words,
tax loss is certain, while revenue is uncertain. According to
international experience, a shift towards better defined tax
bases, a restructuring of the tax system and the focus of audit
may be of decisive importance.
It is an observed trend that the ratio of informal employment
is high in countries where the burden on capital income is
lower than the burden on labour income, thereby directly
encouraging the underreporting of labour. Violating the
horizontal equity by allowing different tax burdens may
damage the tax-compliance attitude. However, flat-rate tax
systems often tried to impose equal tax burdens on labour
and capital incomes without success, because the real
difference between the burdens on entrepreneurs and
employees can be identified in the differences of social
security contributions and the definition of the tax base.
These differences explain the diverse effects the flat-rate tax
reforms of the last decade had on tax compliance and on the
economy (Keen et al., 2006, Saavedra, 2007).
Is it a solution to decrease the difference between
contributions payable by entrepreneurs and employees? This
may be suggested by the trend that in those countries where
the social insurance burdens of the self-employed are much
lower than those of the employees, the ratio of the self-
employed is higher, and the problem of tax evasion through
small enterprises is more serious (OECD, 2004). Greece,
Latvia and Lithuania can be mentioned as examples, where
the self-employed pay a low, one-sum contribution. The
situation is similar in Hungary as well; the self-employed pay
their contributions on the basis of at least the minimum wage
(SET-payers) or the double of the minimum wage, instead of
paying on the basis of their actual income. There is really no
significant compliance problem in those countries where the
contribution paid by the self-employed is roughly equal to
that paid by the employees and employers (e.g. Australia,
New Zealand, Denmark and Finland) (OECD, 2004). In
Finland, the extension of contributions to personal capital
incomes is implemented through the obligation to pay on the
dividend as well.
8
In practice, the alternatives to reducing the difference
between the contribution burdens are focused audits and
administrative measures. According to the OECD (2004), the
problem of hidden income is less significant in those
countries where instead of controlling the amount of labour,
great emphasis is put on determining corporate income (e.g.
Australia). In the fight against the illegal forms of reporting
labour income as capital income an important role may be
played by administrative measures, such as revealing
simulated contracts and entrepreneurs that have one
customer. In Norway, for example, where the taxation of
labour income is different from that of capital income (dual
income taxation), the splitting between labour and capital
incomes for the self-employed and small enterprises is done
in accordance with a specific and strict method. According to
the Norwegian ‘split’ model, from the total income the
capital income is defined as the yield of the capital invested
in the enterprise according to a specific rate, while the
remaining part is the labour income. Certainly, even the split
model does not allow for exact separation, as it adds some
kind of a risk correction factor to the risk-free rate of return.
However, it can allow for professional and sectoral aspects to
be taken into account instead of undifferentiated solutions
(e.g. SET, minimum tax, etc.).
Decreasing the difference between contributions payable by
entrepreneurs and employees can be also implemented by
reducing the contributions of employees and increasing other
taxes. The limit of the reduction of contributions is that it
cannot affect those pension contributions to which a direct
benefit is linked by individual. This has to be treated in a
closed system, i.e. revenues should be consistent with
expenditures over the longer term as well. By contrast,
health-care, unemployment benefits or disability pension do
not constitute a closed system by individuals, and according
to international experience these can be covered from taxes
too. Consequently, in this case it would be possible to carry
out a regrouping between contributions and those taxes
which impose taxes on hidden incomes or do not distort the
tax burden between labour and capital incomes.
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8 Currently, health contribution has to be paid on certain capital incomes in Hungary as well, and the rate of contributions increased from 2007 onwards, but only up
to an upper limit, to HUF 450 thousand in 2007.One of the options of restructuring is the local business tax
applied in developed countries, which imposes tax on labour
and capital incomes at the same time. This is a tax on
domestic added value, irrespective of its use (consumption,
export). From this aspect, it is different from VAT, which
imposes tax on imports instead of exports. The EU was also
of the opinion that the IRAP applied in Italy does not
constitute a duplication of VAT. It is also easier to collect
than VAT, because it can be imposed on the basis of the
corporate balance sheet and not on the basis of individual
invoices. In Germany, this tax was introduced in the 1930s,
but the tax base gradually narrowed in the 1980s. Starting
from the 1950s it was adopted in several states of the USA;
in some states it complemented, in other states it replaced the
corporate tax. In its current form it has been applied in
Hungary and Italy since 1998 and Japan since 2004.
Subsequently, in Canada and France the tax reform
committee proposed its introduction. With its low rate and
broad tax base the local business tax results in significant
revenues, because it is hard to avoid (consequently, it is less
popular). In our case, a 3 per cent rate could even result in a
revenue of 2.7 per cent of GDP, which could partly replace
either health-care or unemployment contributions.
The other possibility of restructuring stems from imposing
taxes on hidden incomes, although a much lower level of
revenue regrouping can be expected of such a measure. The
underlying reason is that due to the information asymmetry
the authority cannot distinguish between those who hide
their income and those who have low earnings. In order to
avoid the negative labour market effects on the really low-
wage group, there can be two ways of widening the tax
base. One of them can be a low amount of fixed health-care
contribution, which is not related to employment, but all
insured adults are subject to it, with very few eligible for
exemption (e.g. the unemployed, pensioners). The other
possibility is a type of property tax. This can particularly
increase the efficiency of the tax system and enhance the
prevalence of the principle of horizontal equity, if income
underreporting is a widespread and relatively easy exercise,
while hiding property elements from the tax authority is
costly, and the collection of property type taxes is simpler
and feasible at a lower cost. For example, it is more difficult
to hide real estates from the tax authority, although an
efficient recording of real properties requires resources, and
a property tax which is introduced without serious
sanctions and which is easy to circumvent does not
contribute to the reduction of tax evasion. For example, in
the case of the tax on housing real estate, reporting the
housing real estate as company property in order to avoid
taxation must be prevented. Otherwise it is exactly those
entrepreneurs who will have an opportunity to avoid paying
the new tax who also have better opportunities in evading
their income tax. In addition, the introduction of the
property tax, if it can be deducted from the personal
income tax, is possible through the widening of the tax base
in a way that the burdens of current taxpayers will not or
only hardly increase.
To summarise the lessons drawn from international
experience, it needs to be emphasised that ‘permanent tax
reform’, i.e. continuous changing of tax rules year by year
generates an unforeseeable economic environment and has a
negative impact on tax-compliance attitudes. Terminating the
loopholes that result in significant revenue losses and
administrative measures against tax evasion is not equal to tax
reform. Measures that increase tax compliance over the short
run and mitigate and technically prevent tax evasion over the
short run do not necessarily result in a longer-term
improvement in the tax-compliance attitude. Sweden in the
1980s and the example of Greece show that after learning the
new tax rules and finding the loopholes, the level of tax
evasion is restored, and tax amnesty even spoils tax-
compliance attitude by being easily included in the
expectations. However, a consistent and comprehensive
package of measures (changing the tax structure, reasonable
compromises and administrative rules) contributing a positive
change in taxpayers’ attitude (Sweden in the 1990s), may be
successful. Increasing the role of local taxes (real estate tax,
business tax) may contribute to the improvement of tax-
compliance; in this case information is also more direct, and
taxpayers can also perceive the benefit of the tax paid.
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